The article argues for the thesis that the Austrian novelist and essayist Robert Musil (1880-1942) may be read as an exemplary kind of social theorist, a philosopher and critic of European civilization who exploits the literary devices of irony, ambivalence and aesthetic distance in order to communicate a particular style of thinking about the social conditions, movements, ideologies and contradictory identities of modernity that could not otherwise be expressed in the abstract discursive language of social science. The article explores a number of respects in which Musil's writing can be seen as ironizing our frequent perception of modernity as dominated by the evils of alienation, anonymity, fragmentation and occupational specialization, by exposing the extent to which this perception expresses elements of naïvety and complacency inherent in classical European humanistic discourses centring on values of Bildung and the 'many-sided personality'.
may be read as an exemplary kind of social theorist, a philosopher and critic of European civilization who exploits the literary devices of irony, ambivalence and aesthetic distance in order to communicate a particular style of thinking about the social conditions, movements, ideologies and contradictory identities of modernity that could not otherwise be expressed in the abstract discursive language of social science.
The central methodological premise of this thesis is that literature and sociology are not mutually exclusive but interdependent forms of discourse. Literature need not only form an object for sociology, as when we speak of the 'sociology of literature'; it may also form a medium of sociological thinking in its own right; while sociology, for its part, may also be shown to depend in interesting and significant ways on forms of cognition that are figurative in character, such as narrative, metaphor and analogy. Musil's work may therefore be approached as a normative source of sociological thought, equal in its claim to convey knowledge about society to the writings of accredited sociological thinkers such as Weber, Durkheim or Simmel, yet different in its mode and style of communicating this claim.
My reading of the social-theoretic argument of Musil's great novel is essentially as follows. Through the voice of Ulrich, the central protagonist of the novel, Musil ironizes our frequent perception of modernity as dominated by the evils of alienation, anonymity, fragmentation and occupational specialization, by exposing the extent to which this perception expresses elements of naïvety and complacency inherent in classical European humanistic discourses centring on values of Bildung and the 'authentic self'. Musil asks us to consider whether the ideal of 'authenticity' (Eigentlichkeit), of the 'many-sided personality' possessing 'qualities' (Eigenschaften), able to live at one with the world by 'appropriating' the products of his or her actions in the world in an organic 'totality' of personal attributes and achievements, might not be a comforting illusion, impossible to realize in an age of irreducible complexity and indeterminacy, and whether the 'authentic' response to modern social conditions, if there is one, might not instead lie in affirming constitutive ambivalence, difference and multiplicity, and not limiting the possibilities of cultural and ethical conduct to any single governing project or moral law. In this proposal, Musil by no means bids farewell to Enlightenment ideals of personal well-being through rational social transformation, but he subjects these ideals to a kind of ironic reflexive questioning that helps us to become clearer about what the central aspirations and problems of modernity fundamentally are, and moreover in a manner that owes its unique insight and illumination to his choice of a peculiarly literary mode of aesthetic figurative communication.
The argument I am here ascribing to Musil is very likely to be familiar to most readers from recent postmodernist discourses of the 'de-centering of the subject' and the demise of 'old European thinking', of the dismantling of 'binary oppositions' between inner and outer, authentic and inauthentic, identity and difference, surface and depth, and so on. However, my specific concern here is to show how, as a literary essayist writing in the context of early 20th-century Austro-German intellectual culture, Musil already introduces a dimension of critical reflexivity into the leading discourses of modernism, long before anyone ever heard of such movements as deconstruction, post-structuralism or genealogical criticism.
In order to realize this proposal, however, there are clearly a number of questions I need to address initially. First, what exactly is the methodological justification for reading literature as sociology and sociology as literature in this way? Second, what is it about the form, context and milieu of Musil's writing in particular that makes him so interesting for social theory, and what could a socialtheoretic reading contribute in this regard that is not already conveyed by other scholarship on Musil? Third, how much sociological or social-theoretic writing did Musil in fact read, and what bearing would these facts have on the validity of such an account? After addressing these questions, I outline one component of the main thesis concerning what I take to be Musil's ironic treatment of the theme of the 'tragedy of culture' in the cultural sociology of Georg Simmel, as well as to some extent in the thought of Nietzsche and Max Weber. Then I offer some discussion of the development of this irony in one of the most famous passages of the novel where Ulrich is first baptized by the character Walter as 'the man without qualities'. I conclude with some brief comments on later themes in the novel, including some very brief comments on the important relationship between Ulrich and his sister Agathe.
Literature and Sociology
The idea of reading sociology as literature and literature as sociology is likely to invite at least two objections, to which I need to respond.
Firstly, it might be objected that to read sociology as literature is to undermine the scientific claims of sociology in irresponsible ways, to reduce the methods and objectivity of sociological explanation merely to so many forms of rhetorical persuasion, perhaps rather in the manner of the postmodern pragmatism of Richard Rorty (1989) , or in the spirit of a purely culturally focused semiotics typical of what Rojek and Turner (2000) have recently dubbed 'decorative sociology'.
My brief answer to this is to emphasize that I do not want to assert a wholesale equivalence between sociology and literature: only to indicate how some classic instances of sociological discourse can be shown to be framed or inflected by figurative devices in ways to which it is instructive to devote attention in order to assess how these devices either enhance or hinder the insight of the explanation. The thesis I am proposing does not subscribe to any version of the 'cultural turn' in sociology that might be construed as holding that any attempt to analyse independent societal structures is a rhetorically self-defeating enterprise, much less that cultural representations are the only thing worth studying in sociology. The point of the thesis is only to underscore the constructive contribution of metaphor, narrative and analogy to some of the classic arguments of sociology about modernity and to draw attention to the context of intense dialogue between social thinkers, artists, philosophers and poets in the makings of sociology in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Robert Nisbet (1976) famously wrote about portraits, landscapes, role-types, metaphors of systems-in-motion and 'iconic imagination' in sociology, most spectacularly in the grand narratives and historical dramas of Marx, Durkheim, Tocqueville, Lukács and others. To these cases one need only add such obvious motifs as Weber's metaphors of the iron cage and 'switchmen' on the railway lines of material and ideal historical development; or biological analogies of the circle, cycle and comic return in functionalist discourses of unintended consequences and the reintegration of action; or 'dramaturgical' metaphors of the theatre of self-presentation in ethnomethodology; or techniques of de-familiarization and Brechtian 'alienation effect' in contemporary comparative ethnography.
Here my main concern is essentially with a second, converse type of objection about the legitimacy of reading literature as sociology. Here it might be objected that to read literature as sociology is to confer fixed meanings on literature in a way that can only fail or be of limited interest because literature is inherently polysemic and resistant to translation in determinate discursive terms, such as in the terms of sociology. Indeed it might be objected that the claim that literature can convey a certain style of thinking about society that normal scientific sociology cannot is 'performatively contradicted' by my very act of saying what that style of thinking is in determinate discursive terms. Thus it might be thought that the outcome of this proposal is likely to be either (1) that I do not prove that literature can express certain kinds of thought that sociology cannot, or (2) that if I do prove this, I succeed only in conveying a very limited, univocal account of the multivalent meanings that literature can evoke.
Against this, it should be stressed that not all types of literary writer need be seen as inherently resistant to sociological reading. Some writers are known consciously to have invited readings of this nature. Wolf Lepenies (1988) points out in his magisterial study of the makings of sociology in the 19th century that writers such as Balzac, Stendhal, Flaubert, Zola and H.G. Wells saw themselves as elaborating a 'science of human mores', a science of the comédie humaine in Balzac's sense, and simply chose to write narrative fiction as the most rhetorically effective means of communicating this critical spirit of social inquiry. These writers are important for sociology because their stories and depictions tell us about aspects of social life that require particularization and dramatization in the context of individual life experiences. They tell us about such eminently social phenomena as love, suffering, pleasure, fear, prejudice and many other kinds of feelings and emotions in the lives of sociologically exemplary characters, their various relationships to one another, and the typical dilemmas and challenges they face, in a way that social science can only perform by necessary abstraction and generalization. What social science gains over literature -and why it certainly should never be replaced by the latter -is explanatory power, based on systematic comparison between sets of data analysed into component parts that can be empirically verified against intersubjectively recognized procedures of observation, and that consequently immunize against caricature, idiosyncrasy and myopia. What it loses is concretion and hermeneutic adequacy towards irreducibly particular life histories and irreducibly particular configurations of social experience. Literature and social science both trade in typification, but whereas scientific typifications must satisfy comparability across different social contexts, at the cost of concrete particularity, literary typifications and characterizations supply concretion and significance, though at costs of objectivity.
Certainly one should not deny the limits of sociological readings of literature. One thinks perhaps of Lukács' rather forced interpretation of Kafka in terms of alienated man's confrontation with capitalist bureaucracy, which constantly seems to founder on the inexhaustible semantic plenitude of Kafka's allegories, whose references seem inherently undecidable as between bureaucracy, authority, death, cruelty, the law or something even more elusive. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the argument against overly determinate interpretation must cut in two directions to make sense. By this I mean that metaphor cannot variegate and subvert meaning except in some relation to determinate meaning. As Ricoeur (1978) , among others, has shown, in order for the lyrical to elude discursive fixation, there must be something for it to elude: some meaning that it implicitly invokes in the very act of expanding and transfiguring that meaning. Therefore, any reading of literature is entitled to begin with at least some effort at determinate interpretation, at least of a provisional kind, in the manner of a hermeneutic circle. Since the German romantics, literary theorists have long been familiar with the problem that for the determinate concepts of criticism to relate to the indeterminate qualities of the poetic object, the critical medium must itself take on qualities of the object, and hence itself become in some sense poetry (see Benjamin, 1973) ; but if this is the case, the converse must also be true: in order for poetry to be meaningful at all, the object must in turn imply the possibility of discursive analysis. Thus while my social-theoretic interpretation of The Man Without Qualities could in no way claim to state the definitive meaning of Musil's text, it could, nonetheless, claim to offer one legitimate bunch of necessary keys with which to enter into its particular semantic universe, out of which further, possibly less determinate meanings might then arise for the reader in the experience of reading. This approach would only be in contradiction with itself if I were to claim that literature offered superior modes of knowledge about society to scientific sociology and then to translate these modes in scientific sociological terms; but this is not the claim being canvassed here. My claim is just that literature offers unique ways of understanding social life, the meaningfulness of which depends on determinate identification of sociological reference but which also is not exhausted by such identification. To speak with the later Wittgenstein, if we can express any thoughts at all, then we can express them clearly; but clarity of expression does not depend on a choice between use of an exclusively scientific meta-language of translation or else a mystifying embrace of the ineffable and unnameable.
Musil, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna and the Cultural Forms of Modernity
I now turn to the question of what aspects of form, cultural context and milieu make Musil's writing of such interest to social theory. Sociologists and social theorists have of course long been interested in modernist writers and poets giving voice to the structural transformations and dislocations of modern social life. One thinks of Benjamin on Baudelaire and the city, Lukács' pairing of Kafka and Thomas Mann, Adorno on aesthetic modernity in Valéry and Beckett, or Jameson on Brecht, and so on. Here I take Musil because of his special association with that crucible of social and cultural change that is early 20th-century Vienna (see Janik and Toulmin, 1973; Schorske, 1981) . Musil articulates a whole range of political changes and cultural discourses emerging from the fault-lines of central Europe and the crumbling Austro-Hungarian empire before the First World War. At a time when Freud launches his revolutionary studies of dreams, neurosis, hysteria and the unconscious, when Wittgenstein and the logical positivists proclaim the bankruptcy of metaphysics, or when expressionist painters such as Schiele and Kokoschka depict the anguish and yearning of the tortured and alienated human self, and Schoenberg revolutionizes traditional European tonality in music in the turn toward dissonance, Musil captures this Zeitgeist in a unique prose of probing complexity. Musil is, to be sure, not the only writer to emerge from this Viennese milieu with similar fundamental preoccupations. Mention must certainly be made of the themes of class distinction and alienation in Schnitzler, political corruption and power in Kraus, bourgeois moralism and aristocratic aestheticism in Hofmannsthal, and disenchantment, value nihilism and utopian reverie in Broch, to name only a few of the most significant figures. Nonetheless, there are particular formal characteristics of Musil's writing that arguably make his analyses especially perspicuous and illuminating for social theory.
Among the most obvious of these features is Musil's unique blend of discursive and lyrical prose, his characteristic enactment of long meandering dialogues and monologues through the voices of a small number of intimately related characters in a manner that seems to recall Platonic dialogue and Socratic self-questioning, and yet also in a manner that constantly seems to be subverted by unexpected, sometimes bizarre uses of analogy and figuration, of light parody, bathos and irony, as well as ellipsis and melancholy reticence. This feature reflects Musil's distinctive preoccupation with the relation between science and art in modern times, between intellect and feeling, or 'precision and soul', as he calls it; his fascination with mysticism and yet his deep admiration for the methodical ethos of the natural sciences, his training as an engineer, his doctoral dissertation on the positivist philosophy of Ernst Mach, and his visceral antipathies to obscurantist neo-romantic and neo-expressionist discourse. This spirit of at once inquisitive and yet irreducibly equivocal presentation is often associated with the concept of 'essayism', with the idea of an inherent difficulty of modern thought to reconcile concept and intuition, totality and fragment, objectivity and impressionism, fixity and transience, as Lukács (1974) and Adorno (1991) famously elucidate with reference to Simmel.
Another significant feature in this regard must surely be the specific timeconstruction of Musil's novel. The narrative appears to occupy a time-frame of no more than about one year before the dark looming presence of war and its outbreak in 1914. The chapters seem to roll by like minor episodes in a soapopera, in a daily episodic circulation of the same familiar characters conversing in enclosed domestic interiors, and yet simultaneously evoke some higher standpoint of cosmic meaning, some much sought-after but obscure understanding of historical totality beyond myth and ideology. We can associate the timeconstruction of Musil's novel in this sense with what Franco Moretti (1996) has termed 'modern epic', with the suggestion that the mythical, cyclical dimensions of archaic memory and time can nevertheless return in an age of modernity in the minutiae of everyday life and the finite fleeting experiences of an insignificant individual, just as Joyce narrates Ulysses through one day in the life of Bloom or as Proust devotes thousands of pages to just a few brief episodes of his encounter with French high society. Yet modern epic still fundamentally differs from archaic epic inasmuch as it can never achieve the same closure and totality of experience; and here too it must be significant that Musil never finished his novel, leaving only a voluminous bundle of semi-finished drafts for the continuation of the narrative, with no explicit sketch of a conclusion. For the very nature of his novel seems to imply a profound difficulty of conclusion, a deep resistance to 'the sense of an ending' (Kermode, 1966) . Where Thomas Mann can end Der Zauberberg with Castorp's descent from the mountain into the front line of war and presumable death, Musil seems only to be able to imply his characters' demise in the war, never represent it, never to enact their death in any final event of consummation or sublimation. This feature strikes a chord with some of the central themes of modern social theory concerning the broken, disenchanted, for-ever unfinished character of individual life-stories in the modern world (see Lukács, 1971) .
Evidence for Musil's engagement with philosophical and sociological authors is immediately striking. There is a large quantity of authors with whom it is certain that he was either (i) personally acquainted, or (ii) in written correspondence, or (iii) attendant at lectures and presentations, or (iv) intellectually acquainted from direct study, or (v) 1903 and 1910 . He certainly attended the lectures of Dilthey during this time, as well as those of his doctoral tutor, the gestalt psychologist Carl Stumpf. It seems that Musil was not especially interested by academic sociological writing, and indeed the intellectuals for whom he held greatest personal respect seem to have been mostly natural scientists and mathematicians rather than Geisteswissenschaftler. But it is certainly true that he was intensely agitated by popular receptions of the major European intellectual figures and by the confusions and frailties of popular bourgeois intellectualism of the time, as only a glance at the highly concentrated reflections of his diaries, essays and letters demonstrates (Musil, 1978) . It therefore seems legitimate and fruitful to view both Musil's fictional and non-fictional writing in terms of a rigorous considered response of his own to this popular bourgeois intellectualism. By delving down into the quagmires of intellectual commonplace, Musil explores the psyche of his age and re-emerges from this descent into the cave as a fierce critic of ideology and a champion of the cause of enlightenment in the mode of literary irony.
Other scholars have explored readings of Musil in these terms. Much of the existing scholarship is by no means purely literature-specific, and few recent socio-contextual studies of Musil can fairly be assimilated to the type of objectifying 'sociology of literature' alluded to at the outset of this article -the type one might associate, for example, with the work of Lucien Goldmann (1967) . The studies by Bolterauer (2000) , Bouveresse (1993 Bouveresse ( , 2001 , Bringazi (1998 ), Brokoph-Mauch (1992 , Haslmayr (1997) , Jonsson (1998 Jonsson ( , 2001 ), Kochs (1996) , Luft (1980) , Müller (1972) and Wimmer (1998) all offer exemplary explorations of the collective cultural voices of Musil's characters and narratives in terms of both their determinate historical identity and their normative significance for the self-understandings of modernity. These scholars examine Musil's story in terms of confrontations between different antagonistic voices of modernity: between 19th-century liberal Bürgertum and 20th-century collectivism and socialism, between modernism and anti-modernism, nihilism, aestheticism, rationalism and mysticism. My proposal here is to take these analyses one step further and to suggest that in place of the still largely historically specific logical subjects in terms of which these scholars interpret Musil's narrative, we may substitute a single logical subject of a more abstract kind, the subject of modernity. By the 'subject of modernity' may be understood the cogito of Descartes, the transcendental subject of Kant, the world-spirit of Hegel, the universal class of Marx, the gendered multicultural subject of late modernity. The subject of modernity in these senses is Ulrich, the man without qualities, but it is also woman (Agathe, Clarisse, Diotima); it is the elite and the reactionary (Leinsdorf, Stumm, Tuzzi), the bogus and the complacent (Arnheim, Hagauer), the insane (Moosbrugger) and the fanatic (Meingast, Hans Sepp); and it is also the Jew (Fischel), the servant girl (Rachel) and the slave boy (Soliman); and it is also, not least, the mass and the multitude of the city, nation and state. In all these senses, Musil examines the subject of modernity in all its contradictory states of identity and difference, in its dialogue with itself and in its relation to the other.
One significant context in which I propose to demonstrate this thesis concerns what may be viewed as Musil's ironizing treatment of the theme of the 'tragedy of culture' in the late writings of Simmel, to which I now turn.
Ironizing the 'Tragedy of Culture'
In a similar spirit to the way Harvey Goldman (1988) has studied the concepts of personal salvation and the bourgeois calling in the work of Max Weber and the early novels and novellas of Thomas Mann, especially in the decline and fall of the Protestant family business of Buddenbrooks and in the desperate attempts of Mann's character Tonio Kröger to reconcile art with bourgeois respectability, I want to suggest an analogous parallel between Musil and the fin-de-siècle 'sociological impressionism' of Simmel. Here I take my initial inspiration from David Frisby's (1981: 157-64) suggestion that the world of The Man Without Qualities might fruitfully be read as a fictional representation of the many aspects of complexity and interconnectedness, of 'forms of sociality' and 'stylization of life', of reification, and aestheticism that Simmel describes in The Philosophy of Money; as well as from Peter Berger's (1970) analysis of perspectivism and 'multiple realities' in Musil through the lens of Schützian phenomenological sociology. However, in order to establish the sense of this proposal, a few words should be set in place first about the main narrative events of the novel.
Set around the eve of the First World War, The Man Without Qualities follows no dominant action-led narrative. Indeed nothing very much seems to 'happen' in the novel. (One might even suggest that what it is for events to 'happen', as new and distinct experiences rather than mere repetitions of an eternal 'same' or 'pseudo-reality' [das Seinesgleiche], is a central theme of the novel.) The novel consists for the most part of a series of philosophical dialogues between Ulrich and various members of Viennese society over topical issues of the day, such as the decline of tradition and the function of culture, life in the modern metropolis and the calling of statesmen, and art, morality and religion after the 'disenchantment of the world' by science and western rationalism. Ulrich appears to drift through life without direction, work and firm attachments to people. He plays and dissimulates, and never appears to speak 'from the heart'. He comes into contact with the members of the organizing committee for a 'Parallel Campaign' to rival the national awakening of Prussia. These are the pompous state official Tuzzi and his wife, Diotima, Count Leinsdorf and General Stumm, who unwittingly lay bare the confusions and atrophy of a moribund state bureaucracy. They stand for 'Kakania', Musil's satire on the rotting Austro-Hungarian empire from the abbreviation k. & k. (kaiserlich und königlich) , the empire whose ruling notables still like to believe in the last refuge of Kultur against the poisonous new religions of science, industry, commerce and the mass society. Diotima falls in love with Arnheim, a successful German businessman modelled on the Weimar industrialist Walter Rathenau. Against Arnheim's sanctimonious talk of the need for community and the 'union of Culture and Capital' (Bildung und Besitz), Ulrich searches for a way of reconciling reality with possibility through an aesthetic understanding of life. Yet he is censured by a society that prizes duty and legality, stigmatizes the Jew Leo Fischel, and is prepared to condemn the psychopath Moosbrugger in the name of a transcendental moral law. In the last part of the novel, after the death of his father, Ulrich meets with his sister, Agathe, who leaves her arid and unloving professorial husband and settles in with Ulrich in what appears to be an incestuous erotic relationship but which symbolizes some higher, ultimate, yet still elusive state of human togetherness and love, some utopian state of redemption that Musil famously calls 'the other condition' (der andere Zustand).
I now turn to some ways in which these themes might be seen as bearing on Simmel's thesis of the 'tragedy of culture'. In the essay on 'The Concept and Tragedy of Culture' from 1911, Simmel argues that in the course of modernity the objective world of social institutions through which individuals strive to realize their own capacities ultimately becomes their own downfall because the sheer complexity of society makes it impossible for them to form meaningful, comprehensive identities for themselves through their own work and occupation. With the increasing complexity of society and increasing specialization and fragmentation in the division of labour, culture starts to become an alien and insuperable totality of its own that no longer permits subjects to return to themselves as organic personalities. Individuals no longer know their place in the complex totality of unintended consequences of action and no longer possess sufficient practical knowledge to live at one in their world, because the social world extends infinitely beyond them, resulting in a constant deferral and sublimation of desire. In the sphere of expressive activities, art and literature become dominated by formalism and technique, while science and technology become a self-seeking industry of their own, divorced from all meaning of knowledge for life. Currency and capital socialize individuals into communication with each other and erect a common system of value enabling objective mediations between want and need but also purge us of all ability to discriminate sensuous differences between qualities. Thus culture, the very enterprise that elevates humankind, is also the very thing that crushes us. Simmel writes:
The concept of all culture is that the spirit creates something independent and objective, through which the development of the subject from itself to itself makes its way. But, in so doing, this integrating and culturally determining element is predestined to an autonomous development, which still consumes the forces of human subjects, and still draws such subjects into its orbit, without elevating them to its own height: the development of the subjects now can no longer take the path followed by the objects.
The infinitely growing stock of the objectified mind makes demands on the subject, arouses faint aspirations in it, strikes it with feelings of its own insufficiency and helplessness, entwines it into total constellations from which it cannot escape as a whole without mastering its individual elements.
There thus emerges the typical problematic condition of modern humanity: the feeling of being surrounded by an immense number of cultural elements, which are not meaningless, but not profoundly meaningful to the individual either; elements which have a certain crushing quality as a mass, because an individual cannot inwardly assimilate every individual thing, but cannot simply reject it either, since it belongs potentially, as it were, to the sphere of his or her cultural development.
( 1997: 72-3) Here the tragedy of culture for Simmel means the downfall of that humanistic ideal of the European Enlightenment inherited from the Renaissance and the ancient Greeks that thematizes Bildung and the 'many-sided personality': the ideal that runs like a leitmotif throughout the works of Lessing, Schiller and the German early romantics, in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister but also in the early Marx's youthful idiom of the universal association of producers, as well as more generally -in a very much more degraded and ideological form -in the popular discourses of 19th-century German Bürgertum. Where Weber's tragedy is the iron cage or 'steely casing' of etiolated vocations in the state, bureaucracy and market that no longer vouchsafe the individual a meaningful relationship between inner faith, selfhood and social role, Simmel's tragedy is at once more absolute and more naïve. Whereas Weber (and of course, for different reasons, Durkheim) accepts specialization and even, at least for the capitalistic burghers and Puritans of early modern Europe, positively endorses it as the very pathway to redemption of the soul through worldly callings, specialization for Simmel is fundamentally at odds with human well-being. Weber's famous quotation from Tolstoy 1 at the end of The Protestant Ethic about 'specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart' (2002: 124) is as central to Simmel's vision as it is to Weber's; but whereas 'specialists without spirit' for Weber are a specific case of the failure of modern Berufsmenschentum to live up to the necessary challenge of Beruf, for Simmel they are the inevitable progeny of the very logic and tragedy of modern culture.
To say that Musil 'ironizes' this thesis -in Simmel, but more particularly in its degraded ideological form -is to say several things. It is to suggest that to substitute 'modern society' or 'modern culture' for the tragic subjects of Orestes, Oedipus or Hamlet is to betray some secret admiration for a Promethean agency that rears up a world that becomes its own undoing. It is to suggest that the idea of a 'tragedy' here implies some covert investment of love in a heroic subject of destruction that can be nothing if not narcissistic and self-ingratiating. It is to suggest that to speak of a 'tragic flaw' in these terms is to flatter ourselves with notions of dignity, depth, wholeness and authenticity that may turn out to mystify and obfuscate far more than they clarify.
In these senses, Musil appears to be arguing from the standpoint that Nietzsche reaches after his rapid abandonment of Wagner and The Birth of Tragedy from 1872, the later Nietzsche of Human, All Too Human (1878) and The Gay Science (1880), the Nietzsche who invites us to scrutinize ourselves from a distance and to 'think against ourselves', to see surface, dispersion and difference as as important as depth, wholeness and identity, and to take time to consider the claims of those brutely objectifying sciences of physics, physiology and psychology that have no truck with the metaphysical and the undemonstrable. Simmel of course was by no means ignorant of this Nietzschean move; indeed he knew Nietzsche's thinking very well; but he nonetheless decided against Nietzsche in favour of Schopenhauer's pessimistic vision (Simmel, 1995) ; whereas Musil affirms Nietzsche. Musil affirms the possibility that 'man' may be destined to destruction, to an endless infernal life 'without qualities', or an to endless question-begging 'doubling' of the interior and exterior, the empirical and the transcendental, the return and retreat of the 'origin', as Michel Foucault will later proclaim in The Order of Things.
The Specialist Without Spirit and the Man Without Qualities
One of the clearest illustrations of these motifs in my view is Chapter 17 of Musil's text, entitled 'The Effect of a Man Without Qualities on a Man With Qualities'. This is where Ulrich visits the home of the young married couple, Walter and Clarisse, and is first named by Walter, in a fit of rage, as 'the man without qualities'. Walter is the failed artist, a talented boyhood friend of Ulrich's, who could once look forward to a distinguished life in the arts, and yet a man who has ended up hopping from one fleeting job to another, trying his luck variously as a painter, a composer, conductor, music critic, editor, schoolteacher, and finally ending as an obscure official in a government department dealing with the arts. Walter, then, par excellence, is the art-loving amateur, but a pitiful, rather desperate, very bourgeois kind of amateur. He is, to be sure, no soulless Fachmensch, no specialist; but neither, sadly, is he the many-sided universal personality he would like to be. He is in fact just a many-sided dilettante. His relationship to Clarisse is troubled by her reluctance to have a child with him and by her underlying contempt for his inner weaknesses of character; and in consolation Walter seeks refuge in playing the languid intoxicating music of Wagner to himself on the piano. We must therefore regard it as significant that when Musil first introduces the discourse of the demise of the humanistic personality and conjoins this discourse with the perception of Ulrich as an idle irresponsible flâneur, an insincere man of pure intellect without a heart or a soul, it is through the voice of Walter that he chooses to express it.
Walter bursts out to Clarisse that Ulrich has 'an intellect . . . but . . You can't guess at any profession from what he looks like, and yet he doesn't look like a man who has no profession, either. And now just run your mind over the sort of man he is. He always knows what to do. He can gaze into a woman's eyes. He can exercise his intelligence efficiently on any given problem at any given moment. He can box. He is talented, strong-willed, unprejudiced, he has courage and he has endurance, he can go at things with a dash and he can be cool and cautious -I have no intention of examining all this in detail, let him have all these qualities! For in the end he hasn't got them at all! They have made him what he is, they have set his course for him, and yet they don't belong to him. When he is angry, something in him laughs. When he is sad, he is up to something. When he is moved by something, he will reject it. Every bad action will seem good to him in some connection or other. And it will always be only possible context that will decide what he thinks of a thing. Nothing is stable for him. Everything is fluctuating, a part of the whole, among innumerable wholes that presumably are part of a super-whole, which, however, he doesn't know the slightest thing about. So every one of his answers is a part-answer, every one of his feelings only a point of view, and whatever a thing is, it doesn't matter to him what it is, it's only some accompanying 'way in which it is', some addition or other, that matters to him. (Musil, 1953: Vol. I, 71) Here, according to Walter, Ulrich is the man without qualities because he has every quality and no quality. Walter's outburst here dramatizes the perception of a dis-integrating self in the dispersed cosmos of the modern metropolis. Perhaps it is not that 'soul' finds itself irreparably alienated from 'form' and 'exteriority' but that soul is just the dirempted play of non-coinciding forms and signs of interaction between the producers and consumers of 'qualities', a Sprachspiel of roles and personas (Bouveresse, 1987 (Bouveresse, , 1993 . And perhaps that creeping relativity of morality that so frightens Walter in Ulrich betokens not so much some dreadful morass that we conjure at our peril as rather an opening and a possibility: an opening to the incomparable situatedness of ethical relations beyond 'legislative' morality (Bauman, 1993) . Hence perhaps authenticity, that precious but elusive other of alienation that feeds our existential cravings for depth, harmony, genuineness and home-coming -the 'jargon of authenticity', as Adorno (1974) denounces it in Heidegger -may very well lie simply in the play with inauthenticity. There are numerous other episodes and contexts of the novel in which Musil develops these elements of irony: in Ulrich's reflections on 'possibility' and the 'abolition of reality'; in the comedy of desire and the body that is Diotima's unacknowledged passion for Arnheim and its absurd Platonic spiritualism; in the judgement on Moosbrugger and the theme of the intertwining of responsibility and pathology; in the unctuous moralism of Hagauer and Lindner; and, perhaps most important of all, in the perennially inconclusive conversations of Ulrich and Agathe on science, God, love, good and evil.
Here, however, I will conclude with just one final consideration. This is that in 'ironizing' values of truth, wholeness and sincerity over against illusion, surface and dispersion, it must be emphasized that Musil does not blankly cancel or reject these values. Since Schlegel, Kierkegaard and Adorno, philosophers have long stressed that irony is not the antithesis of its subject. Irony is neither the antithesis of 'p', nor the synthesis of 'p' and 'not p', but the paradoxical conjugation of 'p' and 'not p'. Irony is the thinking of a thought in relation to its limits of possibility. It is a work of the self, a work of unending 'engagement and detachment' (see Elias, 1987) that challenges the self to find autonomy, meaning and ethical togetherness with others by means of a critical journey into the reverse of these values, so as to disclose the possible dogmas and naïveties that subtend them when they are asserted without circumspection. Thus to say that Musil ironizes Enlightenment humanist discourses of autonomy and authenticity is not to say that he proclaims them null and void, but rather that he invites us to seek ways of critically rescuing these values through a dialogue with their negation. This, I believe, is at least part of the import of Ulrich's later transformation in Part Three of the novel in the union with Agathe. For here Musil demonstrates Ulrich's partial rediscovery of authenticity in his relation to woman, in his ethical reflections on the limitations of aesthetic withdrawal, and in his attempt to face the infinite burden of responsibility for reason and 'precision in matters of the soul'. Yet here too, once again, there is no final closure of irony, no resolution of aporia, no final overcoming of alienation in the union with Agathe, which Musil describes as at once 'ungetrennt und nichtvereint' ('unseparated and not-united') . Certainly, Ulrich mellows and learns to find community of a sort with others; but there is no decisive return of Ulysses to Ithaca, no final reconciliation after some long Wanderjahre in an ideal 'odyssey of mind'. Ulrich's fate remains equivocal, undecidable and unfinished.
In all these senses, we can conclude that while The Man Without Qualities is certainly no otiose postmodernist farewell to enlightenment, it is, nonetheless, an attempt to think through the ideals and contradictions of modernity in all their complexity and ambivalence. If modernity has been said to be about that search for autonomy of the subject 'without dependence on an other' of which Kant speaks in the essay on enlightenment, then Musil's 'philosophical discourse of modernity' shows us that in our search for meaning and identity in the midst of rationalized and disenchanted social order, there can be no simple recourse to religion to patch up the holes in a scientized lifeworld, or to universalizing moral systems to resolve the complexities of ethical situations, or to the brute certainties of 'lived experience', national belonging or time-honoured cultural heritage to provide a sense of direction in life. Autonomy is an unending labour of the self, a work of irony.
Notes
I acknowledge the support of the Leverhulme Trust in preparing this article. Here I concentrate mostly on methodological and contextual issues; in other submissions I devote more space to substantive themes, characters and episodes in the novel (Harrington, 2001 (Harrington, , 2002a (Harrington, , 2002b . I must acknowledge some reproduction of material in this article from a piece in the Norwegian Yearbook of Sociology (Harrington, 2002a ).
1.
Whether this quotation is in fact from Tolstoy, however, is not certain. Another plausible candidate is Nietzsche in Also sprach Zarathustra, although no exactly corresponding passage has been identified. Tolstoy is a plausible candidate inasmuch as Weber held deep respect for Tolstoy's Weltanschauung and discusses him in other places.
